U.N.
RESOLUTION 242:
ORIGIN, MEANING,
AND SIGNIFICANCE
April
2002
Contents
Foreword
To
students of the Middle East and political leaders and diplomats
throughout the world the number 242 conjures up the tragic events of
the past and underscores the pervasiveness of the problems that
continue to threaten peace and stability in the region. Whenever
hostilities erupt or negotiations resume between the parties to the
long-standing conflict, the number, together with the Security
Council resolution to which it refers, is invoked
automatically.
U.N.
Security Council Resolution 242 was meant to establish a "just and
lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in
security." But thirty-four years after its adoption, peace continues
to elude the region. Nevertheless, as the proposal made in February
2002 by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah suggests, 242 continues
to shine like a beacon over the political landscape of the Middle
East. Despite the fact that his 1981 initiative, in which he offered
a similar proposal for breaking the deadlock in the peace
negotiations concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict and the
Palestinian problem, did not succeed, Abdullah's new attempt has
evoked excitement in many capitals and appears to be nurturing hopes
for the resuscitation of peace negotiations.
While
reaffirming its belief that the responsibility for concluding a
"just and lasting peace" remains with the parties themselves, who
should be encouraged to talk to each other, the National Committee
on American Foreign Policy considers that Resolution 242, despite
the often contradictory claims of the parties and different
interpretations of the text, remains a valid document that can serve
as a framework for a final settlement. Obviously, today's conditions
are completely different from those of 1968, when the shadow of the
cold war hovered over the drafting of the resolution. Indeed the
resolution's prescriptions should be considered in light of current
international circumstances and changes that have taken place in the
region.
Therefore, the National Committee considers it of interest to
circulate the text of the resolution together with the article
Justice, Arthur J. Goldberg, who was the U.S. ambassador to the U.N.
at the time of its adoption, wrote for the American Foreign
Policy Interests on the occasion of its twentieth anniversary in
1988.
George
D. Schwab
President
Resolution 242 After Twenty
Years
Arthur J. Goldberg
Twenty
years have elapsed since the adoption of Resolution 242 by the
United Nations Security Council. It is timely and appropriate
therefore to reassess this resolution, which has been called one of
the most important in the history of the United Nations, and to
speculate about whether it can continue to serve as the basis for a
comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East. Such an analysis
requires both a review of the events that led to the adoption of the
resolution and an attempt to answer the question whether the
resolution remains viable.
Background
In May
1967 the late President Nasser of Egypt moved a substantial number
of Egyptian armed forces into the Sinai, ejected the U.N.
peacekeeping forces, reoccupied and remilitarized the strategically
important Sharm-el-Sheik, and proclaimed the closing of the Straits
of Tiran. In so doing, President Nasser shattered the status quo
that had prevailed in the area since the 1956-1957 war.
These
were ominous measures. Israel, which had responded to American
pressure by withdrawing its forces from Sinai and Sharm-el-Sheik in
1957, had continued to assert that any action that prevented its
ships and cargoes from passing through the Straits of Tiran would be
considered an act of war. Moreover, faced with well-armed Egyptian
forces on its borders and the provocative statements of Nasser and
other Arab leaders, Israel had little choice other than to order the
mobilization of its predominantly civilian army. Tension in the area
became acute.
Justified concern prompted the Western powers, including the
United States, to take the initiative in promptly convening the
United Nations Security Council in order to attempt to avert a
conflict by restoring the status quo ante. The attempts made in the
Security Council and those made through private diplomatic channels
failed because of Arab objections that were supported by the Soviet
Union. Apparently, both the Arab states and the Soviet Union were
willing to risk war.
When
the war broke out on June 5, 1967, the Western powers renewed their
attempts to bring about an effective cease-fire on the first day of
battle, hoping to stabilize the situation before it could be
radically altered. Because of faulty intelligence or an
unwillingness to face the facts, the Arab states, supported by the
Soviet Union, refused to permit a cease-fire resolution to be voted
on that day even though the cessation of hostilities would have
conduced to the advantage of the Arabs. It should be recalled that
in the first few hours of the fighting, the Egyptian Air Force was
effectively destroyed, thereby determining the outcome of the
war.
Only on
the second day of the war, after it became apparent to all objective
observers and analysts that Israel had won the war, was agreement
reached in the Security Council on a resolution calling for a
cease-fire. Although Egypt accepted the resolution immediately,
Jordan and Syria delayed their acceptance despite the fact that
Israeli forces were advancing on all Arab fronts.
The
cease-fire resolutions adopted during and after the Six Day War
differed in substance from Security Council resolutions relating to
the Israeli-Arab wars waged during the preceding nineteen years. In
the earlier resolutions, calls for a cease-fire were invariably
accompanied by demands for the withdrawal of troops to positions
held before the conflicts erupted. In June 1967, however, provisions
for withdrawal were not incorporated in the cease-fire resolutions.
This provision was not omitted by accident. Instead, the omission
reflected the reaction by a majority of the members of the Security
Council to the events that led to the outbreak of war. As the
debates revealed, the majority of the members of the Security
Council were unwilling to vote for the unconditional withdrawal of
Israeli forces because of their conviction that a return to the
armistice regime would not serve the goal of securing a just and
lasting peace between the parties.
This
conviction was evidenced by the action that the Security Council
took with respect to a resolution introduced by the Soviet Union.
The Soviet resolution not only affirmed the Council's call for a
cease-fire but also condemned Israel as the aggressor and demanded
the withdrawal of its forces to positions held on June 5, 1967,
before the conflict erupted. The Soviet resolution was supported by
six of the fifteen members. (Nine are required to adopt a
resolution.)
Israel
was not condemned as the aggressor because of the widely shared
conviction that President Nasser's actions—particularly the eviction
of the U.N. peacekeeping forces, the movement of Egyptian troops
into the Sinai, and the closing of the Straits of Tiran—provoked the
war. Further, the unwillingness of a majority of the members of the
Security Council to support the Soviet resolution for a withdrawal
of Israeli forces to the positions they held before June 5, 1967,
was based on the conviction that the withdrawal of troops should be
made in the context of a peace settlement that would ensure secure
boundaries for Israel, replacing the violated and provisional
armistice lines.
The
Soviet Union did not allow the matter to rest after its initial
defeat in the Security Council. It called for an emergency special
session of the General Assembly, which convened on June 17, 1967.
The General Assembly failed to adopt by the requisite two-thirds
majority a resolution (offered by Yugoslavia and several other
members and supported by the Soviet Union and the Arab states) that
differed in tone but not in substance from the Soviet resolution
that was rejected by the Security Council.
The
Adoption of Resolution 242
When
the special session of the General Assembly adjourned in September
1967, the matter reverted to the Security Council and again became
the subject of further public debate as well as intensive private
negotiations and finally culminated on November 22 in the adoption
of Resolution 242.
The
draft resolution was presented by the British ambassador, Lord
Caradon, who was selected as a sponsor because
of his acceptability to the Arab states. It was based on a
resolution that had been offered by Latin American states to the
special session of the General Assembly and a United States
resolution that was introduced when the Security Council meeting was
resumed.
The
unanimous support garnered for Resolution 242 was the result of
intensive diplomatic activity undertaken by the United States both
at the United Nations and in foreign capitals throughout the world.
This is not to say that Great Britain, Latin American countries,
India, and other states were not actively engaged in negotiations
and diplomatic activity; but the United States took the primary role
in facilitating the adoption of the resolution. In fact, Resolution
242 parallels the U.S. draft resolution.
It
should be noted that before the vote was taken, the Soviet Union
offered another draft resolution that condemned Israel as the
aggressor and called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the
June 5 lines. The Soviets did not press this resolution to a vote
because majority support was lacking. The United States followed a
similar course of action not because its draft resolution lacked
majority support but because it regarded Resolution 242 to be
satisfactory.
Before
the vote on Resolution 242 was taken, it was determined by an
unofficial count that not only the members of the Security Council
but also Israel, Egypt, and the other concerned Arab states did not
object to the resolution. Resolution 242 was adopted unanimously
after a minimum of speech making.
The
Rationale Behind the Arab-Israeli Acceptance of Resolution
242
Having
been rebuffed both in the Security Council and in the General
Assembly, the Arab states came to the conclusion that the language
of Resolution 242 was the best that they could hope to obtain at the
time. They obviously counted on its ambiguities to enable them to
assert their own interpretations of the language. Further, they
calculated that the passage of time would erode the support of the
United States and like-minded states for Israel, and, of course,
they did not foresee President Sadat's courageous initiative in
going to Jerusalem and in participating in the negotiations that
culminated in the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.
To a
certain extent, their calculations proved to be prescient. World
opinion, overwhelmingly supportive of Israel as the "underdog" at
the time of the 1967 war, has shifted to produce a measure of
sympathy for the defeated and now "underdog" Arab states, and some
Western countries have watered down their support for the principles
embodied in the resolution.
The
Israelis accepted Resolution 242 for some of the same reasons as
those subscribed to by their Arab antagonists. It was the best
resolution that Israel could hope to get from the United Nations
under the circumstances. The Israelis were fearful that their
diplomatic support would erode if they proved to be intransigent.
Like the Arab states, Israel concluded that the ambiguities of the
resolution would enable it to assert its own interpretation. Most
important, Israel recognized the danger of an overly inflexible
position in light of its need for American military hardware and
economic assistance, which were provided.
The
Provisions of Resolution 242
Resolution 242 is a carefully—some would say artfully—drafted
set of guidelines designed to promote agreement and to assist the
parties to achieve a settlement. Certain key aspects were designed
to be ambiguous in order to allow flexibility in
negotiations.*
The
stated goal of the resolution is the establishment of a just and
lasting peace that would enable every state in the area to live in
security. In the resolution, the Security Council expressly
repudiated the concept of an imposed peace and called for
"agreement"—an "accepted settlement" by and between the parties.
Thus the experience of the 1957 imposed settlement was to be
avoided. The council supported instead a consensual peace agreement
to be negotiated by the parties—an endorsement that
was scarcely surprising in light of the collapse of the 1957 imposed
settlement and the shattering of armistice agreements.
The
resolution stipulates respect for and acknowledgement of the
sovereignty of every state in the area. Because Israel has never
denied the sovereignty of its neighbors, this provision obviously
requires those countries to acknowledge the sovereignty of Israel
and its right to exist. The negotiating history of Resolution 242,
as reflected in the debates and votes in the Security Council and in
the special session of the General Assembly that was held in 1967,
shows that there was little support in the U.N. community for the
view that after two decades, Israel's existence could still be
denied by its Arab neighbors.
The
resolution does not explicitly require that Israel withdraw to the
lines that it occupied on June 5, 1967, before the outbreak of the
war. The Arab states urged such language; the Soviet Union proposed
such a resolution to the Security Council in June 1967, and
Yugoslavia and other nations made a similar proposal to the special
session of the General Assembly that followed the adjournment of the
Security Council. But those views were rejected. Instead, Resolution
242 endorses the principle of the "withdrawal of Israeli armed
forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and
juxtaposes the principle that every state in the area is entitled to
live in peace within "secure and recognized boundaries." In light of
Arab unwillingness to acknowledge Israel's right to exist, this
language, thought applicable to all states, was designed primarily
to ensure Israel's right to existence within secure boundaries
recognized by its Arab neighbors.
The
notable omissions in language used to refer to withdrawal are the
words the, all, and the June 5, 1967, lines. I refer
to the English text of the resolution. The French and Soviet texts
differ from the English in this respect, but the English text was
voted on by the Security Council, and thus it is determinative. In
other words, there is lacking a declaration requiring Israel to
withdraw from the (or all the) territories occupied by it on and
after June 5, 1967. Instead, the resolution stipulates withdrawal
from occupied territories without defining the extent of
withdrawal. And it can be inferred from the incorporation of the
words secure and recognized boundaries that the territorial
adjustments to be made by the parties in their peace settlements
could encompass less than a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces
from occupied territories.
To
buttress their claim that the resolution calls for a complete
Israeli withdrawal, the Arab states contend that this interpretation
is overly restrictive. They point to such language as "the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." This
language, the Arab states argue, calls for the complete withdrawal
of Israeli forces from all of the territories occupied by them in
the Six Day War. Further, the Arab states contend that the U.N.
Charter supports their contention that the military conquest of
territory is inadmissible. It is arguable whether under
international law this argument applies to the Israeli occupation of
the West Bank. It seems clear that under the circumstances, Israel
exercised the right of self-defense in the 1967 war. It should be
noted that Jordan occupied the West Bank by war in 1946, contrary to
the United Nations partition resolution. (Only two states recognized
this annexation: Great Britain and Pakistan.) On the other hand,
Israel has occupied the West Bank by war since 1968. By principles
of prescription, Israel has occupied the West Bank for approximately
the same period as Jordan. Thus the status of the West Bank under
international law is questionable, although in realistic and
demographic terms, the rights of Palestinians must be resolved short
of Israeli annexation. The most that can be said of the withdrawal
and related language of Resolution 242 in light of this negotiating
history is that it neither commands nor prohibits territorial
adjustments in the peace agreements contemplated in the
resolution.
As
recognized in the Camp David Accords, there is a difference between
international boundaries, presumably intended to be permanent, and
provisional armistice lines. Furthermore, the withdrawal language of
the resolution seems to indicate that its patent ambiguities and the
differing interpretations of the parties only can be resolved by
settlements concluded after negotiations between the
parties.
On
certain aspects the resolution is less ambiguous than the language
pertaining to withdrawal. Resolution 242 specifically deals with
free passage through international waterways. In precise language it
affirms "the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation
through international waterways," which include the Gulf of Aqaba.
This language underscores the fact that blocking Bab el Mandeb and
other points of access to the Red Sea is prohibited. The principle
of international law that governs free passage through international
waters was also acknowledged in the Camp David Accords.
Resolution 242 contains the phrase "respect and
acknowledgment of ... the territorial integrity of every state in
the area." This language has been cited in support of the demand for
the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all of the occupied
territories. That demand overlooks the fact that for many years the
Israelis have sought respect for their territorial integrity, which
has been withheld from them by the Arab states and the
PLO.
The
resolution refers to the utility of the establishment of
demilitarized zones in ensuring peace and guaranteeing territorial
inviolability. The location of the demilitarized zones was left to
the parties to negotiate, as was done at Camp David between Egypt
and Israel.
Resolution 242 strongly supports the view that a peace
settlement is not to be imposed and that the resolution is not to be
self-implementing. Instead, it stipulates that third-party
assistance, the parties are to negotiate with third and to agree to
an acceptable settlement. (This provision was confirmed by U.N.
Resolution 338, which was unanimously adopted on October 22, 1973,
during the Yom Kippur War. This resolution "decides that
negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate
auspices, aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the
Middle East.")
A
notable omission in 242 is any reference to Palestinians, a
Palestinian state on the West Bank or the PLO. The resolution
addresses the objective of "achieving a just settlement of
the refugee problem." This language presumably refers both to Arab
and Jewish refugees, for about an equal number of each abandoned
their homes as a result of the several wars. Of course, time works
changes, and the Camp David Accords recognize that the rights of
Palestinians will have to be recognized in a comprehensive peace
settlement.
Another
notable and purposeful omission from Resolution 242 is any specific
reference to the status of Jerusalem and the reaffirmation of past
U.N. resolutions calling for the internationalization of the city.
Resolution 242 thus realistically recognizes the desuetude of the
internationalization resolutions and leaves open the possibility of
an agreement for a unitary Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty that
would provide appropriate safeguards for Muslim and Christian holy
places and possible Vatican-type enclaves or boroughs for the Arab
population of Jerusalem. No Israeli, dove or hawk, will ever
surrender any part of Jerusalem.
Resolution 242 and Camp David
In the
peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, the product of Camp David,
Resolution 242 was acknowledged to be the basis for the settlement.
It should be recognized, however, that the boundaries between Israel
and Egypt before the 1967 war were internationally recognized
boundaries, not provisional armistice lines. Those boundaries were
recognized in the Camp David Accords and served as the rationale for
Prime Minister Begin's agreement to remove all Jewish settlements
from the Sinai. Since then, the United States has made several
attempts to mediate a comprehensive peace settlement based on
Resolution 242 and the Camp David Accords. They have all
failed.
Resolution 242 in the Context of an International Peace
Conference
Recently King Hussein of Jordan proposed an international
peace conference to be composed of the concerned parties and the
five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council:
China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United
States. The terms of reference presumably would be Resolution
242. It is not clear whether King Hussein visualizes the
international conference to be a shield for direct negotiations with
Israel or a conference in which the permanent members would play a
substantive role. It is also not clear in what manner the PLO would
participate and the extent of its participation.
The
United States and Prime Minister Shamir of Israel first joined in
opposing such a conference because of their belief that it would
open the door to the Soviet Union to play a significant role in the
area. Prime Minister Shamir and his Likud party still firmly oppose
any international conference, and Secretary Shultz said recently
that "an international conference in and by itself is of no interest
to the United States. The way to go is through direct negotiations.
If there is some way to construct an international conference that
meets the results we are seeking, we are willing to examine that
possibility."
After
King Hussein, the most ardent proponent of an international
conference is Shimon Peres, deputy prime minister of Israel. He has
thus far avoided the dissolution of the coalition government over
this issue by stating that his support is subject to several
conditions: The participation in the conference of the permanent
members of the Security Council will be symbolic; direct
negotiations will take place between the concerned parties; the PLO
will have to accept Resolution 242 in order to participate; its
representatives cannot be members of the PLO hierarchy; they must be
members of the Jordanian delegation; the status of Jerusalem as an
undivided city under Israeli sovereignty is not negotiable, although
agreement can be reached on appropriate measures to safeguard the
security and autonomy of Muslim and Christian holy places; and the
Soviet Union will have to agree to reestablish diplomatic relations
with Israel.
Peres
is an astute politician who knows that these conditions are not
acceptable to the Arab states, the Soviet Union, and the PLO. He is
apparently willing to assume the risk that if an international
conference were to be convened and negotiations ensued, the deep
yearning of the people of Israel for peace would impel Shamir to
support a reasonable compromise. But it is questionable whether
Peres and his Labor party will win the next election, which would
alone empower Peres as prime minister to attend an international
conference and conduct negotiations.
The
Uncertain Future of Resolution 242
The
ultimate questions are whether the United States is prepared to
exercise to the fullest extent its great influence to facilitate the
peace process; whether the PLO will continue its fruitless role of
rejection and terror or agree to a sensible compromise; and whether
the leaders of Israel and its neighboring Arab states are mere
politicians or statesmen who possess vision and courage.
Two
things are certain in this volatile and dangerous matter. The United
States must take the lead rather than play a passive role in
pursuing the difficult objective of a comprehensive peace in the
Middle East, and if a settlement is negotiated, it will be based on
Resolution 242.
Note
*Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967
The
Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in
the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace
in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their
acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a
commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the
Charter,
- Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires
the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East
which should include the application of
both of the following principles:
- Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency
and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of every State
in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
- Affirms further the necessity
- For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
international waterways in the area;
- For achieving a just settlement of the refugee
problem;
- For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and
political independence of every State in the area, through
measures, including the establishment of demilitarized
zones;
- Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special
Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and
maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote
agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted
settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in
this resolution;
- Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security
Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special
Representative as soon as possible.
About the
Author
The
late Arthur J. Goldberg was a justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (1965-1968),
and ambassador-at-large and chairman of the United States delegation
to the Belgrade follow-up conference (1977-1978).
©
Copyright 2002, 1988 by the National Committee on American Foreign
Policy, Inc., New York. All rights
reserved. | 
